To address the issue of the welfare costs of informed trade, we construct a new GlostenMilgrom type model with elastic uninformed trade. The bid-ask spread causes a welfare loss because uninformed agents choose not to trade when their idiosyncratic valuation lies within the spread. We show that if private information is sufficiently long lived (long time until it is revealed), the average spread and total welfare loss are mainly decreasing in the amount of informed trade. This result contrasts with familiar comparative statics and arises due to a tradeoff: more informed trade results in wider spreads and larger welfare costs initially, but because information is reflected in prices faster, spreads and welfare costs are lower later. For short-lived information, the tradeoff does not materialize and thus spreads and welfare losses are mainly increasing in informed trade. Our findings suggest that regulation of information disclosure and informed trade should consider the horizon of private information.
Introduction
A significant amount of capital market regulation around the world is concerned with maintaining a level playing field with respect to information. For example, in the US, Regulation FD ("Fair Disclosure") states that if a company provides material information to anyone, it must release it to everyone, and if material information is leaked, the information must be promptly made public. The intent is clear-companies cannot convey to anyone an informational advantage.
1 Rule 242.601 of Regulation NMS ("National Market System") that covers the "dissemination of transaction reports and last sale data" states, among other things, "…no national securities exchange or national securities association may…prohibit, condition or otherwise limit…the ability of any vendor to retransmit or display in moving tickers, transaction reports or last sale data…"
The regulation does not control what an exchange may charge the vendor for the data, except to say that the charges must be "…reasonable [and] uniform…" At least in part, the regulation is aimed at leveling the playing field with respect to trade history These examples suggest that regulators, among others, consider it important to have a level playing field with respect to information; that is, the cost of an un-level playing field is at least as large as the cost of regulation. We propose, however, that we really do not have much of an idea of the welfare cost of informed trade. The questions we seek to address in this paper are what, in fact, are the welfare consequences of 1 Corporate disclosure rules in some other countries are even more stringent. For example, in Australia, Continuous Disclosure Rules oblige listed companies to inform investors (through the stock exchange) of any information that could be reasonably expected to have a material effect on the price or value of the securities as soon as the company becomes aware of the information. Violations can attract civil and criminal sanctions. For this analysis, we are not interested in the value (or cost) of the information that informed trade might convey, but rather the mechanism by which the information comes to be reflected in prices. One might imagine that informed trade provides signals to managers and thus leads to better real decisions (e.g., Fishman and Hagerty, 1992; Chen, Goldstein and Jiang, 2007) . On the other hand, information that comes out before hedgers have an opportunity to hedge provides a welfare cost of information (e.g., Foucault and Cespa, 2008; Glosten, 1989) . We provide no analysis of these questions here. Our paper analyzes the welfare created by gains from trade (the buyer and seller surpluses) and how this quantity is impacted by informed trade. The welfare loss associated with informed trade is defined as the total welfare of all participants without informed trade, but with the same information that would be generated by informed trade, less the total welfare of all participants with informed trade. Thus, the cost of informed trade is calculated for the same information arrival process. Welfare losses occur when, due to the costs of adverse selection, some potential welfare enhancing trades are not undertaken and thus aggregate gains from trade are less than their full potential.
To see why the welfare consequences of informed trade are not obvious, consider the standard example of a Glosten-Milgrom model in which the future price will either be high or low. Informed traders know the future value and arrive at rate . Uninformed randomly buy or sell and arrive at rate . The higher is , the higher is the initial spread, but the faster information is revealed through trade, and the lower is the spread after some time has elapsed. Thus, if we consider the spread to be a measure of welfare loss (not in general legitimately as we will show), we see that with higher , the total welfare loss might be quite low since most of the time trading is at a very small spread.
On the other hand, with low , the initial spread is low, but this spread will persist for a longer time since information revelation is slower.
Market microstructure models are suggestive of a welfare cost of informed trade since they deliver a trading friction-a spread between the bid and offer. Yet, the models have not generally been useful for this since they typically involve noise traders with inelastic trading demands-traders whose trades are independent of the terms of trade.
Both Kyle and Glosten-Milgrom models typically use noise traders. With noise traders, the spread represents merely a transfer from the uninformed to the informed with the dealers as zero profit conduits. A few market microstructure papers have fully endogenized trade in order to make welfare statements (e.g., Glosten, 1989; Bhattacharya and Spiegel, 1991; Ausubel, 1990; Medrano and Vives, 2004) . These models, however, consider only a point in time and do not address the dynamic issues considered here. Given that welfare losses stem from the bid-ask spread, we start by analyzing the dynamics of spreads and how informed trade impacts on spreads through time. Our analysis reveals a tradeoff: higher intensity of informed trade causes wider spreads in early trading but also faster convergence of prices towards the fundamental value and therefore narrower spreads in later trading periods. For sufficiently long-lived information (and/or sufficiently precise information), a higher rate of informed trade can actually decrease expected spreads in contrast to familiar comparative statics. For shortlived information (information that is revealed within a relatively short period of time), the tradeoff does not materialize and expected spreads are monotonically increasing in informed trade.
Our characterization of spreads mirrors Roşu's (2014) result that in a dynamic limit order book model a higher share of informed traders improves liquidity because it reduces uncertainty about the fundamental value. Importantly, Roşu's results arise in a dynamic setting with long-lived information. We show that the same mechanism is at work in our simpler sequential trade model with sufficiently long-lived information when accounting for the dynamics. Furthermore, Roşu (2014) conjectures that the 'adverse selection view' (that more informed trading leads to higher adverse selection risk) is more appropriate in circumstances with short-lived information and the 'dynamic efficiency view' (that more informed trading leads to better overall liquidity) is applicable with long-lived information. Our analysis formalizes this intuition by showing that the relation between informed trading and liquidity depends on the horizon of the information.
The specification of uninformed preferences allows calculation of the expected total welfare gained from trading. We compare this welfare to the expected total welfare that would be earned in an environment with the same information process as that generated by the informed trade but with no spread. The latter minus the former is the welfare loss of informed trade, keeping the information the same. The expected welfare loss per period is related to the spread, but is not identical to it.
Our analysis indicates that the welfare loss is single peaked in the amount of informed trade, reaching a maximum at an internal point. That is, after some point, the welfare loss is decreasing in the amount of informed trade because with more informed trade information gets into prices faster and average spreads decline. For short term information the maximum loss occurs at a very high probability of informed trade meaning that the welfare loss is mostly increasing in the amount of informed trade. For longer term information, the maximum occurs at a relatively small probability of informed trade suggesting that over some range, the welfare loss is actually declining in informed trade.
It is easy to imagine that the per capita profit to the informed traders declines with the number of informed traders. Thus the equilibrium number of informed traders (and hence the probability of informed trade) is determined by a break-even condition based on the cost of becoming informed. The analysis above suggests that if obtaining private information is relatively costly and therefore the amount of informed trade is low, then an increase in the cost of obtaining information will reduce the probability of informed trade, which will reduce the welfare loss and increase total welfare. On the other hand, if information is relatively cheap and the probability of informed trade is high, an increase in the cost and consequent decrease in the amount of informed trade will decrease the welfare loss for short-lived information, but increase the welfare loss for long-lived private information. The welfare costs and benefits of insider trading have been extensively debated in the law and economics literature as well as in the finance literature. In the finance literature, the discussion is typically framed within a noisy rational expectations equilibrium paradigm. Furthermore, most of these papers are of the normal-CARA type (except Ausubel (1990) and Bhattacharya and Nicodano (2001) ), and investigate the effect on real investment of insider trading. Ausubel (1990) , Bhattacharya and Nicodano (2001) and Medrano and Vives (2004) are notable in that they do not rely on noise trade (random supply) and hence can calculate expected utilities. Indeed Medrano and Vives (2004) provides numerical results that suggest it is not legitimate to do a welfare analysis in the presence of noise trade.
The normal-CARA model, is typified by the one in Medrano and Vives (2004) .
There are three types of traders-those with information, those who wish to hedge a random position correlated with the future security value and speculators. The future value of the security is an exogenous normal random variable. Three types of results come out of this model. The fact that the price conveys information makes uninformed traders' demands less responsive to price than if there were no private information. That is, the market is thinner due to adverse selection. This reduces the amount of risk sharing and hence reduces total welfare.
The second effect is that the price revealing information implies that there is less unrevealed information and the risk premium goes down. This effect is also examined in Easley and O'Hara (2004) . This is perhaps a less interesting result since it follows from the exogenous future payoff. An institutional change (insider trading) that makes the current price more informative will likely make the future price more informative as well leaving the uncertainty of the price change mostly unchanged.
The third effect is often referred to as the Hirschleifer effect-revealing more information before agents get a chance to hedge is welfare reducing. Informed trade then has a negative welfare effect, and the more informed there are, the more information gets into prices (unless the market closes down) and the worse is the welfare effect. This effect is probably stronger in the models than in reality and the model result is again due to the exogenous uncertainty. A change in an institution that increases the amount of information in prices today will also increase the amount of information in prices tomorrow, leaving the unresolved uncertainty roughly the same.
The next section defines the model and derives bid and ask quotes and their dynamic properties. We then characterize spreads and analyze welfare. Finally, we discuss some applications of the model and conclude.
The Model
We adopt a Glosten-Milgrom framework in which there is one risky security, three types of traders (informed, uninformed, and liquidity providers), and trading rounds. The future value of the security at the end of the trading rounds is one of two equally likely values, which (without loss of generality) we set to zero and one, { }. The structure of the model is common knowledge among all participants.
Public information at time consists of the sequence of past buys and sells and their transaction prices, which we denote by . with infinite risk aversion across the domain of uninformed traders' wealth.
< Figure 1 >
Uninformed traders vary in their degree of risk aversion and this generates a distribution in their private valuations. We assume the risk aversion parameter is uniformly distributed across uninformed traders, ).
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Result 1
Given the time expectation of the future value of the security, [ , and the uninformed traders' utility and endowment described above, the private valuation of an uninformed trader that arrives at has the following distribution:
where ) is the probability density function and ) is the cumulative probability density function.
Proof: See Appendix. 4 The parameterization of the utility function follows from normalization so that (i) ) , (ii) ) , and the degree of risk aversion is determined by a single parameter,
[ . In robustness tests we show that the model's main results are qualitatively unaffected by a range of alternative utility functions. 5 The model's main results are qualitatively unaffected by a range of alternative distributions for the risk aversion parameter.
The distribution of uninformed traders' private valuations is illustrated in Figure 2 for three different values of . When , the distribution is uniform. When ( ) the distribution has more mass near zero (one). Thus, private valuations are drawn towards the public information expected future value of the security, , but are spread around this value. Private valuations less than arise from uninformed traders that have positive exposure to the future value of the security and would like to sell the security to hedge their endowment risk. They are willing to sell at prices below the current expected future value with the extent of price concession they are willing to tolerate determined by their degree of risk aversion; private valuations near zero are from the most risk averse traders, and private valuations marginally less than are from the least risk averse. Similarly, private valuations greater than arise from uninformed traders that have negative exposure to the future value of the security and would like to buy the security to hedge their endowment risk. The premium they are willing to pay above the current expected future value is also determined by their degree of risk aversion; the highest (lowest) valuations are held by the most (least) risk averse traders.
Because the endowments with positive/negative exposure to the future value of the security are equally likely, the distribution of private value has equal mass above and below .
< Figure . Across uninformed traders, this perceived quality is uniformly distributed, ). Since these individuals are uninformed by construction, the true probability of receiving the high/low signal is , independent of . This setup, leads to a distribution of private valuations for uninformed speculators that is the same as that of the uninformed hedgers, given in (1a-1b). 6 For a proof, see the Appendix. Because the density of private valuations is the same for hedgers and uninformed speculators, the model's implications are unaffected by the composition of hedgers and speculators in the group of uninformed traders. In other words, the model has the same implications whether uninformed trade is made up of 10% hedging, 90% speculation, a 50:50 mix of these two types, or 90% hedging, 10% speculation.
Second, modeling uninformed traders as having a hedging or speculation motivation for trade that leads to a distribution of private valuations provides a generalization of (rather than simply a departure from) models that specify inelastic Finally, the third type of trader is a representative risk-neutral competitive liquidity provider that has no private information. As is standard in Glosten-Milgrom type models, the liquidity provider posts bid and ask quotes (for a unit volume) that earn zero expected profits. At each time, , a trader arrives at the market and can buy at the 6 This result is not general in that different hedging and uninformed speculation setups may lead to different densities of private valuations. If the densities of hedgers and uninformed speculators (and arbitrarily many other motivations for uninformed trade) differ, they can be combined into a single uninformed private valuation density (allowing the remainder of the model to retain the same structure) by parameterizing the proportions of each type of uninformed trader. 7 The opposite scenarios also provide an interesting special case of the model. Specifically, when all hedgers are risk neutral ( ) and (if the model includes uninformed speculators) when uninformed speculators have no confidence in their signals ( ) the private valuations of uninformed traders are all equal to the current expectation of the future value of the security, . In such a scenario the market closes down because uninformed traders are unwilling to trade at prices other than (i.e., at a spread of zero) so the liquidity provider is unable to set quotes that recoup from uninformed traders the losses incurred from trading with informed traders.
ask, sell at the bid, or abstain from trading. With probability the trader arriving at the market is informed and with probability they are uninformed. After each trade, the liquidity provider Bayesian updates her beliefs about the future value of the security and posts new quotes before the next trader arrives.
An informed trader that arrives at the market having seen the high signal will buy if their private valuation is higher than the ask, . Similarly, an informed trader that has seen the low signal will sell if their private valuation is lower than the bid, . In equilibrium it will always be the case that and , and therefore the informed traders will always trade in the direction of their information. 
Proof: See Appendix.
As long as , is less than the informed valuation given a high signal what happens when . In this case, as is increased, the losses to informed traders decrease. While the profits per uninformed trader increase, the probability of the uninformed trade decreases at a greater rate than the losses to the informed decrease. As a result there are no quotes that will allow trade and nonnegative expected profits to liquidity providers.
Recall that bids and asks are, respectively, updated expectations of in response to a sell and buy. Thus, 
and (3b) Proof: See Appendix.
Equation (3a) shows that the odds of a high future value are revised upward following a buy, downward following a sell and remain unchanged if no trade occurs (because only an uninformed trader may find it optimal not to trade). The amount by which expectations are revised following a trade is determined by , which is an increasing function of the probability of informed trade, , and the quality of the informed traders' information, . Thus, measures of the informativeness of trades.
Equation (3b) shows that all of the information contained in past trades and trade prices can be represented by the number of net buys (buys minus sells), . Thus, the expectation of at any point in time can be expressed succinctly as a function of the number of net buys up to that point in time, and , the informativeness of trades.
For reasons that will become clear later, it is important to note that given , the probability distribution of depends only on the parameters ( and ) and not on the endogenous expectations of . Specifically,
Therefore, given , the number of buys seen up to (but not including) time ( 
Analysis of the Spread
We now turn to a detailed examination of the bid-ask spread, given that the welfare costs of informed trade stem from the spread. In the model, the bid-ask spread arises entirely due to adverse selection risks faced by the liquidity providers who incur losses when they trade against informed traders. The spread allows liquidity providers to recoup from uninformed traders the losses they make to informed traders.
Together, the dynamics of expectations in (3a-3b), and the expressions for the bid and ask quotes in (2a-2c), define the dynamics of the bid-ask spread. The spread at a point in time is given by, Figure 3 illustrates the relation between the spread and other variables at a given point in time. Panel A plots against , the contemporaneous expectation of , for three different values of the trade informativeness measure, . Given the parameters that govern trade informativeness, the spread is at its maximum when , i.e., when (based on public information) there is maximum uncertainty about the future value of the security. During such times, the expected loss to the liquidity provider per informed trade is at its maximum. As the uncertainty about is resolved (either or ), the spread approaches zero.
Panel A also shows that the spread at a given point in time is increasing in the informativeness of trades, . Two parameters determine the informativeness of trades: the probability of informed trade, , and the quality of the informed traders' information,
. Substituting (2c) into (5) to re-express the spread in terms of and and setting for illustration, Panel B shows the relation between spreads, and . At a given point in time and a given expectation of the future value, the spread is increasing in both the probability of informed trade and the quality of the informed traders' information.
With a higher probability of informed trade, the liquidity providers encounter more informed traders per uninformed trader and therefore must earn a larger profit per uninformed trader to break even. When the informed traders have better quality information, the liquidity providers' expected loss per informed trade is higher, again necessitating a wider spread.
< Figure 3 >
The relations illustrated in Figure 3 mirror the familiar comparative statics obtained in most models of equilibrium bid-ask spreads under information asymmetry:
more informed trade leads to wider spreads. Less explored, and perhaps more important for welfare analysis, are the dynamics of spreads and the average spreads through time.
In contrast to the previous analysis of spreads at a point in time, it is not necessarily the case that average spreads through time are wider in the presence of more informed trading. This is because with more informed trading, prices converge faster to the true future value of the security, resolving the uncertainty and eliminating the adverse selection problem sooner. In the comparative statics of Figure 3 , we see this tradeoff in Panel A. Starting at , a higher implies a wider spread; however, a higher also results in sliding down the curve towards or (where the spread is at its minimum) at a faster rate.
To examine the expected spreads, accounting for the dynamics, we re-express the spread in (5) as a function of the parameters that govern informed trading ( , which is a function of and ) and the number of buys and sells received up to that point in time:
Result 4
Recall that the number of buys and sells received up to a point in time, and , and the number of non-trades, follow a trinomial distribution with fixed probabilities.
The expected spread through time (the average across the trading periods ) with (so the market is open irrespective of ) is,
where , and are the conditional probabilities of different trade types defined in (4a)-(4c).
Result 4 shows that the expected spread through time can be computed as a function of three underlying parameters, and , which govern the intensity of informed trade and quality of informed traders' information, and , the number of trading rounds.
The parameter measures the horizon of the informed traders' information because after trading rounds the information about the security value is revealed. 
Analysis of Welfare
We take a libertarian point of view regarding welfare-if uninformed choose to trade they do so because they want to. We motivated the particular form of elastic uninformed trading demand with a hedging scenario, in which uninformed traders can improve their welfare by buying or selling the risky security to reduce risk stemming from their private endowments. However, the elastic uninformed demand is also consistent with other motivations for trade. Therefore, a reduction in uninformed trade represents a reduction in overall welfare.
Gains from a trade for an individual are measured as the difference between the individual's private valuation and the price at which the trade is executed. Therefore, assuming that the market is open, the realized welfare gain of an informed trader that arrives at time is
where { } is an indicator function. Recall ( ) is an informed trader's revised expected value given a high (low) signal. Similarly, the realized welfare gain of an uninformed trader that arrives at time given a private valuation is:
As indicated by the expression above, the uninformed trader has a positive welfare gain if their private valuation is outside the spread and thus their arrival to the market results in a trade, and it is zero when the uninformed trader chooses not to trade because their valuation lies within the spread.
Liquidity suppliers lose when the arriving trader is informed (expected loss equal to the difference between the informed private valuation and the trade price), but gain when the arriving trader is uninformed (expected gain equal to the difference between the prevailing expected value and the trade price). Therefore, the liquidity supplier's realized welfare from trading round is
where { } and { } are indicators for the arrival of an informed and an uninformed trader respectively at time .
The total realized welfare from trading round is the sum of the above components:
The expression above indicates that welfare depends on the amount of informed trade because informed trade determines the bid and ask quotes. The higher and the lower , i.e. the wider the spread, the more uninformed choose not to trade. These forgone gains from trade reduce overall welfare.
The benchmark welfare is that which could be earned with a zero spread.
Replacing and with in (8) results in the maximum welfare that could be earned at a point in time:
Subtracting (9) from (8) leads to the realized per period welfare cost of informed trade:
The welfare cost associated with informed trade stems from, but is different to, we can calculate the expected welfare loss conditional on (the market's expectation of ). The expected one-period welfare cost is given in the following result.
Result 5
Conditional on , and (so the market is open irrespective of ), the expected one-period welfare cost in a given trading round is given by:
For (with so that the market is open), the corresponding expressions are:
The above welfare costs are expected welfare costs at a point in time. They are maximized at ½, similar to the spread, and the costs are symmetrical about ½.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify that (11) is increasing in the informativeness of trades, . While not so obvious, it is possible to show that keeping fixed, expected welfare costs at a point in time (both (11) and (12)) are increasing in the rate of informed trade, . These observations are similar to the comparative statics for spreads, which, at a point in time, are also increasing in .
It is interesting to relate the welfare cost to the spread. This comparison is easiest at , and . The spread is given by ), while the welfare cost is ). One is proportional to the other, but this proportionality changes as the probability of informed trade changes. The spread is proportional to the welfare cost per informed trader.
The main aim of this analysis is to characterize the total welfare loss through time. The per period expected welfare costs in (11) and (12) are a function of and the parameters that govern informed trading ( , which is a function of and ). The dynamics described in (3a) and (3b) show that is a function of the number of buys and number of sells received up to time , which follow a trinomial distribution, conditional on . Therefore, we can write an expression for the expected total welfare cost over time, which is given in the following result.
Result 6
The expected total welfare cost over time is:
where to are given in (4a-4c), and ) is the expected welfare cost per period defined in (11) replacing with ) from (3b) and replacing with (2c) if and with ) if .
The expected welfare cost per period in (13), ), is a function of the number of buys and sells received up to time and the parameters that govern informed trading, and . Therefore, the expected total welfare loss in (13) is a function of only three parameters: the rate of informed trade, , the quality of informed traders' signals, , and the horizon of informed traders' information, .
To show how the expected total welfare costs are impacted by informed trade, Figure 6 plots the relation between [ and for different information horizons.
Panel A shows that when informed traders' signals are perfect ( ) and information is short-lived ( ) the expected total welfare cost is essentially increasing for most of the range of . 11 However, for longer lived information ( and ), the figure indicates that there is indeed a trade-off between high initial per period welfare costs and faster price discovery. As the probability of informed trade increases, the expected total welfare cost initially increases because as the spread becomes wider more uninformed agents' private valuations fall within the spread. But, more informed trade implies that information gets into prices more rapidly, leading to narrower spreads in later trading periods. So, beyond a certain 'tipping' point, an increase in actually reduces the expected total welfare costs. The longer the information horizon, the lower the tipping point beyond which increases in informed trade benefit total welfare. The reason that total welfare costs are largely increasing in when information is short-lived is that the aforementioned tradeoff has little time to materialize. It is only for the longer term information that the tradeoff can be realized.
< Figure 6 >
Panel B of Figure 6 illustrates the relation between [ and when information is imperfect. The left hand side plot uses (relatively good quality information) and the right hand side has (relatively noisy information). The same tradeoff holds with imperfect information. Expected total welfare costs are singlepeaked in , reaching a maximum at an internal point. For short-lived information, the maximum occurs at a very high probability of informed trade and thus the expected total welfare cost is mostly increasing in informed trade. For longer lived information the maximum occurs at a relatively small probability of informed trade and thus the expected total welfare cost is mostly decreasing in informed trade.
It is not surprising that as increases, the total welfare cost increases. Once the information is made public, there is no further welfare cost and so if that occurs quickly, there will be a lower cost. The quality of information also influences the shapes of the curves. The more precise the information, the earlier the tipping point in after which increases in informed trade tend to reduce welfare costs.
Applications
Our analysis provides insights and predictions about a number of settings involving trading on private information. Many companies have self-imposed policies governing when and how company insiders (directors and specific employees) are allowed to trade shares in the company. For example, Bettis, Coles and Lemmon (2000) document that in their sample of listed US corporations in 1996 approximately 92% have policies restricting trading by insiders and 78% have explicit blackout periods. Blackout periods are typically windows of a few days prior to earnings announcements (but can also precede other corporate events such as dividend announcements, quarter-end, and M&A) during which insiders are prohibited from trading.
Our model provides a rationale for blackout periods. The private information that corporate insiders possess in the period immediately prior to an important company announcement such as earnings is relatively short-lived because it is due to become public in a matter of days. Our model predicts that for short-lived information, the bidask spread and the expected total welfare cost are mainly increasing in informed trade because the tradeoff involving faster price discovery and lower adverse selection in later periods has too little time to materialize. Thus, blackout periods may reduce average spreads and reduce total welfare losses. Consistent with this prediction, Bettis et al. (2000) find that during blackout periods, bid-ask spreads are approximately 8.5% or 2 bps narrower. In contrast, the information possessed by corporate insiders at other times is often relatively longer-lived, e.g., information on company performance between reporting periods, or a better sense of the company's long-run prospects. Allowing insiders to trade on such information can be beneficial because, although the insider trades will initially lead to wide spreads and considerable welfare losses, they will be more than offset by lower adverse selection risks and lower welfare losses after the private information is impounded into prices.
With trading fragmented across many markets and occurring with a high degree of automation and speed, determining the best available quotes at a point in time is no longer a trivial exercise. With traders increasingly using technology to compete on speed, timely access to market data and the ability to act sufficiently quickly on such information is also a type of informational advantage in today's markets. For example, Ding, Hanna and Hendershott (2014) find that the official National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) is slow: proprietary data feeds from exchanges can be used to construct a faster NBBO, which frequently experiences dislocations from the official NBBO. The dislocations occur several times a second in very active stocks and typically last one or two milliseconds. Ding et al. (2014) show that access to the exchange data feeds and quick calculation of the NBBO generates opportunities to profit at the expense of slower market participants.
Having access to proprietary data feeds and being able to calculate the NBBO before most other market participants is private information of perhaps the shortest possible horizon: within one or two milliseconds the private information becomes public.
In this scenario, our model suggests spreads and expected total welfare costs are increasing in the amount of trade that is based on dislocations between a proprietary 'fast'
NBBO and the official 'slow' NBBO. Thus, our model predicts that there are benefits to limiting (ideally, eliminating) the number of market participants that use the 'fast' NBBO to exploit slower market participants.
Another example of an extremely short-lived information advantage is documented by Hu, Pan and Wang (2013 Hu et al. (2013) find that there is intense competition between the high-speed traders to exploit their short-lived information advantage: trading volume in the one-second interval after the "early peek" is more than ten times its normal level.
In terms of our model, this implies a very high during the seconds preceding the official ICS announcement.
The welfare implications of the private information in this instance are perhaps not particularly meaningful given the information advantage is restricted to a two-second period that, unlike the regular dislocations of the fast and slow NBBO, only occurs bimonthly. However, a fascinating aspect of this example is the speed of price discovery. Hu et al. (2013) find that almost all of the price discovery takes place in the 15 milliseconds immediately after the early peek, or equivalently, the first 10% of trades in the first second after the peek. After that time, there is virtually no more drift in prices and the official ICS release no longer moves prices substantially. The extremely fast price discovery is consistent with our model, because in this setting the information is very precise and the extremely high.
As a final example, Irvine, Lipson and Puckett (2007) find evidence of "tipping" in which Wall Street Analysts tell good clients when there will be an equity recommendation change (hold to buy or strong buy). This is not illegal, unless the Wall Street Firm has a policy of not doing it. Should it be illegal? This is relatively shortlived information as the authors suggest the tip could be received up to four days before the announcement, but often even closer to the announcement date. Thus, the spread and total welfare costs are likely to be increasing in the amount of trading on such tips, up to a fairly high rate of informed trade. Institutions doing unusual buying prior to an upgrade account for only 2.5% of volume suggesting that is small and we are almost certainly in the region where total welfare is decreasing in the trading of institutions privy to the analysts' recommendations. This might call for a "Reg FD" type response.
Conclusion
Informed trade can cause welfare losses. Liquidity providers set a positive bidask spread to recoup from uninformed traders the losses they incur when trading against the informed. Thus, the bid-ask spread facilitates transfers from the uninformed to the informed. Additionally, the bid-ask spread causes welfare losses because the individuals with private valuations that fall within the spread will choose not to trade. The forgone gains from trade when private valuations fall within the spread constitute a welfare loss to society.
Our analysis suggests that decreasing the amount of informed trade by increasing the costs of informed trade or by imposing restrictions is not necessarily welfare improving, nor does it necessarily lead to narrower spreads on average. If the economy lies on the downward face of the welfare cost hill, then increasing the cost of informed trade will reduce the amount of informed trade and actually increase welfare costs.
Similarly, decreasing the amount of informed trade can actually increase average bid-ask spreads.
These counterintuitive relations arise because of the following tradeoff. More informed trade causes higher adverse selection risks, wider spreads and greater welfare losses initially. But, through time, more informed trade also causes information to be impounded into prices faster, and thus narrower spreads and lower welfare losses later. If the private information is sufficiently long lived (a long time until it is due to be announced), the latter effect can dominate the former, causing average spreads and total welfare costs to be decreasing in the amount of informed trade above a certain amount.
This result follows from analysis of allocative efficiency and gains from trade, and thus does not consider other ways in which informative prices create value, such as better corporate decisions. Additional sources of value would merely strengthen the result that with sufficiently long-lived information, beyond a point, total welfare costs are decreasing in informed trade.
In contrast, there do not appear to be similar benefits from increasing the amount of trade based on short-lived information. For short-lived information it might be argued that there is no value to information getting into prices via informed trade. At the same time, with short-lived information there is insufficient time for the aforementioned tradeoff to materialize and thus reducing the probability of informed trade is likely to be welfare enhancing.
The model in this paper is deliberately kept relatively simple, and therefore a few limitations are worth noting. First, the amount of informed trade is taken to be exogenous and constant through time. The first part is quite intentional. Our view is that information arrives to traders serially. When an individual becomes informed he or she trades on that information. Alternatively, a model might specify a cost of becoming informed which will determine the number of informed agents and the rate at which they arrive to trade.
The constancy of the rate of informed trade is somewhat more problematic, as it is inconsistent with the analysis of Back and Baruch (2004 Finally, the two point Bernoulli distribution of the future value is certainly unrealistic. However, we are not sure that it is any more unrealistic than the normal model, particularly because the model is designed to examine welfare costs over rather short periods of time.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Result 1 -for hedgers
Without the ability to hedge endowment risk, the wealth and utility of an uninformed agent (conditional on the future value of the security) that arrives at the market at time are as follows:
Future value of security Endowment: Endowment:
Given that with probability and with probability , the expected utility of the uninformed agent with endowment is [ , and for the endowment it is [ . An agent with endowment can hedge their risk by selling one unit of the risky security at the bid, giving them final wealth of and utility of ) ) ) ). Similarly, an agent with endowment can hedge their risk by buying one unit of the risky security at the ask, giving them final wealth of and utility of ) ) ) ) ) ). For a given non-zero level of risk aversion, if the bid-ask spread is zero, i.e., , the utility with hedging exceeds the expected utility without hedging for both endowment types. As the ask increases and the bid decreases (as the spread widens), the expected benefits from hedging diminish, and at a certain point (which is a function of the degree of risk aversion, ) the benefits from hedging become zero. Thus, uninformed agents will hedge their endowment risk if the spread is sufficiently narrow, where 'sufficiently' narrow is determined by the agent's degree of risk aversion. More risk averse agents are willing to trade at wider spreads than less risk averse agents.
The private valuation of an uninformed trader with endowment (who wants to sell the security to hedge endowment risk) is the value of the bid at which the agent is indifferent between selling the security to hedge risk and not hedging, i.e., the point at which the expected benefits from hedging are zero. Similarly, for the endowment , the private valuation is the ask at which the expected benefits from hedging are zero. Thus, Endowment: Endowment:
Private valuations:
is increasing in and has the range,
) )
is decreasing in and has the range, Rearranging:
) )
Taking the derivative: ) ) ) )
Given that ), we can apply a transform of variables to obtain the density of uninformed private valuations for both endowment types. Specifically, )
)) | |, and ) )) if is increasing in and ) )) if is decreasing in . ) is the probability density function of uninformed private valuations and ) is the cumulative probability density function.
Applying the transform in variables we obtain the following.
For the endowment :
Given that the endowments and are equally likely, we have,
and therefore, is increasing in and has the range,
is decreasing in and has the range,
Rearranging: ) )
Given that ), we can apply a transform of variables to the density of similar to the hedging setup above. Performing the transform, and combining the densities of high and low private uninformed valuations recognizing that the high and low signals are equally likely, we obtain:
Proof of Result 2
Recall that is the probability that a trader arriving at the market is informed;
) is the cumulative probability density of uninformed private values; is the trade direction ( for a sell, for a buy and for no trade); is the time expectation of the future value of the security, which implies { }; and is the informed traders' signal quality, { }. The following expressions are immediate:
Bayes' rule gives us:
With some substitution we obtain:
Substituting for ) from (1b), solving the quadratic equations for and , and rearranging, we obtain (for ):
Proof of Result 3
Rearranging the expressions for and in (2a) and (2b) gives:
Recall that:
{ Substituting for ) and ) from above and rearranging we obtain,
Iterating from the time of the first trade ,
Given that initially it is equally likely that is high or low ( ), and ∑ is the net number of buys received up to (but not including) the trade at time , the above simplifies to:
and therefore,
Proof of Result 4
Equation (6) gives the spread at a point in time, , as a function of , and . Recall that the number of buys, sells and non-trades received up to a point in time ( , and ) follow a trinomial distribution with fixed probabilities given in (4a)-(4c). The probabilities are , , and , respectively when , and , , and , respectively when . Therefore, the expected spread at a point in time, conditional on is,
and similarly for ,
Given that and are equally likely,
Taking the time-series average of the expected spread at every trading round, ,
Substituting and simplifying, we obtain,
Proof of Result 5
Taking expectations of the realized welfare cost per trading round,
because { } is independent of , , and . The two expectations in the expression above can be computed using integrals and therefore:
Substituting in the distribution function from (1a) and the bids and asks from (2a)-(2b), evaluating the integrals and simplifying, with and we obtain:
When (with so that the market is open) the bids and asks in (2a)-(2b) hold with ). Using this expression for , we obtain the expected welfare costs per trading round when informed have perfect information ( ):
Proof of Result 6
Re-express the expected welfare cost per period in (11) by replacing with ) from (3b) and with (2c) if and with ) if .
This gives the expected welfare cost per period as a function of the number of buys and sells received up to time , and , and the parameters that govern informed trading, and . Denote this function by ).
Recall that the number of buys, sells and non-trades received up to a point in time ( , and ) follow a trinomial distribution with fixed probabilities given in (4a)-(4c). The probabilities are , , and , respectively when , and , , and , respectively when . Therefore, the expected welfare cost in a given period, conditional on is,
) and similarly for , 
